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Abstract 
 
In the debate on the benefits and costs of international financial integration recent literature has 
emphasized thresholds in the development of domestic markets as preconditions to benefitting from 
international integration. This paper offers an alternative view - that of development of competition in 
domestic markets as an aide to de-facto openness. Lack of competition in domestic financial systems 
may prevent countries from reaping the benefits of international integration simply because they 
prevent countries from being integrated in a meaningful way - that of price equalization. Using a new 
index of de facto financial openness, this paper explores the trends in and determinants of cross 
border integration of interbank markets. It finds a strong link between greater competitiveness in 
domestic banking and international integration. The level of de jure controls, volatility and institutions 
matter for price integration but their importance differs between developed and developing countries. 
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1. Introduction 
 
‘The market for a given set of financial instruments and/or services is fully integrated if all potential 
market participants with the same relevant characteristics (1) face a single set of rules when they 
decide to deal with those financial instruments and/or services; (2) have equal access to the above-
mentioned set of financial instruments and/or services; and (3) are treated equally when they are 
active in the market.’ 
 
-- Baele et al. (2004) 
 
When markets are financially integrated in the sense defined above, the law of one price holds, i.e., all 
potential agents in both markets1 will face identical prices for identical assets. This price equalization has 
important implications for the economy's growth, consumption and output volatility, exposure to crisis and 
for monetary policy independence through the trilemma.2  
 
This paper is an attempt to understand the extent to which price integration has progressed in developed 
and developing economies in the recent decade(s) and the various forces that have helped or hindered 
this convergence. Price convergence is measured by the index introduced in Pasricha (2008) that 
captures the size of deviations from covered interest parity as well as the speed of reversion to the no-
arbitrage band. I construct this index on a yearly basis for 54 countries for an average of 13 years per 
country,3 comparing interest rates on interbank loans across countries. Previous attempts at measuring 
price convergence in financial markets have focused on either average absolute deviations (Chinn-Ito, 
2007) which do not capture the speed of arbitrage, or the beta-convergence measure (Baele et al., 2004) 
which captures integration between a group of countries but does not allow one to rank different countries 
on their degree of convergence. The Pasricha (2008) index is the first time-varying index that allows one 
to rank countries and takes into account both the size of their no-arbitrage bands4 and the speed with 
which the arbitrage occurs, once it is profitable.  
 
Using this measure of price convergence, I explore the factors that contribute to this convergence, or the 
lack of it. My main focus is on the link between the degree of integration and the competitiveness of the 
domestic financial sector. While there is a large literature on the implications of domestic banking sector 
competitiveness for growth (Claessens and Laeven, 2005; Cetorelli, 2001), access to finance (Beck et al., 
2004) and stability (Boyd et al., 2007; Boyd and Nicola, 2005; Allen and Gale, 2004; Hartmann and 
                                                 
1  with the same relevant characteristics. 
 
2  see Kose et al. (2009) for an excellent survey. 
 
3  The list of countries and the years for which data is available are listed in Table 1. 
 
4  As discussed in Pasricha (2008), the no-arbitrage band captures the minimum deviation required for arbitrage to be profitable 
and increases with the size of transactions costs and capital controls. 
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Carletti, 2002), the link between the former and the degree of international integration has not been 
delved into. Such a link is important because its existence implies that countries with partially open capital 
accounts would see greater price convergence with international markets if they liberalized their domestic 
banking sector, even without opening it to foreign players. They may also try to put sand in the wheels of 
international capital without appearing to do so, through tightening domestic regulation.  
 
There are several reasons why one would expect a link between domestic financial market structure and 
international price convergence.5 Freixas and Holthausen (2005) show that even in the absence of capital 
controls, when there is asymmetric information between the domestic market and foreign market, a 
segmented market equilibrium may occur, with no interbank activity across the borders. When an 
integrated equilibrium does occur, the interbank market integration will not be perfect (the interbank rates 
will not be equalized), even in the presence of correspondent banking. In their model, the signal that 
banks get about foreign banks' type is more noisy than the signal about domestic banks, leading to an 
interest differential at which a bank may borrow domestically and the interest rate at which it may borrow 
abroad (or from a correspondent bank that borrows abroad to lend domestically). Adding imperfect 
competition in the domestic banking sector to their model will only exacerbate the domestic-foreign 
interest differentials and may increase the range of possibilities where a segmented equilibrium is the only 
possibility. Secondly, market power in the interbank market would lead to greater bid-ask spreads directly 
(Khemraj and Pasha, 2008; Pasricha, 2008b) and through its impact on market liquidity. Carletti, 
Hartmann and Spagnolo (2007) show that bank consolidation may lead to greater variance in aggregate 
liquidity demand and Acharya, Gromb and Yorulmazer (2008) show that surplus banks may under provide 
liquidity when outside options of needy banks are weak. Several empirical studies in the foreign exchange 
market have shown that thinner markets or those with greater volatility have higher bid-ask spreads 
(Cheung and Chinn, 2001; Bollerslev and Melvin, 1994). 
 
The results indeed confirm a strong link between the lack of financial sector competitiveness (banking and 
non-banking) and the lack of price convergence, particularly for low and middle income countries. Capital 
controls explain only a small part of deviations from covered interest parity. Crisis periods and periods of 
greater volatility see lower de facto integration.  
 
In the next section, I describe the construction of the index and in section 3, I discuss the trends in 
financial integration over the sample period. In section 4, I empirically examine the link between domestic 
financial competitiveness and financial integration. Section 5 concludes.  
 
 
                                                 
5  In the absence of capital controls and any kind of friction like asymmetric information that prevents all domestic participants 
from accessing the foreign market and vice versa, price-convergence will occur, irrespective of the structure of domestic 
financial markets. It is only when either capital controls or some other frictions are present (as in the real world) that the 
structure of the domestic financial market becomes relevant. 
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2. Measuring Price Convergence 
 
2.1 Covered Interest Deviations in the Presence of Frictions 
 
In a fully integrated world with perfectly competitive profit maximizing agents and no transactions costs or 
other frictions, the following Covered Interest Parity (CIP) condition would hold in equilibrium: 
 
( ) 0* =−−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −= +++ ktkt
t
tkt
t iiS
SF
Pδ           (1) 
 
where tδ  is the covered interest differential, kti +  and * kti +  are respectively returns on comparable 
domestic and foreign assets between time t and t+k, expressed as per cent per annum. tS  is the 
domestic currency price of foreign currency, ktF +  is the forward rate or the 
thk  period domestic currency 
price of foreign exchange delivered in that period. P is a scaling factor, used to annualize and convert into 
percentage terms, the first term.6 Since all the variables in the above equation are known a priori, any 
deviation from this parity in our model world represents pure profits and therefore cannot exist in 
equilibrium. 
 
However, as discussed in Frenkel and Levich (1975) and in Pasricha (2008a), in a world with transactions 
costs, exchange or capital controls or risk of such controls, differential taxation, the measured covered 
differential would lie in a no-arbitrage band, even with efficient and risk neutral markets. This happens 
because the econometrician's measure of covered differential, which is based on the average of the 
forward and spot rates (rather than the bid-ask rates) and the average of the interest rates does not 
capture the actual profits, net of taxes and other costs of arbitrage. One should then expect the measured 
differential, δˆ  to satisfy: 
 
pn κδκ ≤≤ ˆ       (2) 
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6  For example, if the forward rates are of maturity 1 month, then P = 1200. 
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and the precise forms of nκ  and pκ  depend on the transactions costs and capital controls (as well as 
the levels of exchange and interest rates) and are described in Pasricha (2008a). The measured 
deviations within the no-arbitrage bands are therefore, consistent with equilibrium and with covered 
interest parity, and may be unit root processes. Further, when the supply of arbitrage capital is less than 
perfectly elastic, due either to quantitative controls, asymmetric information, or imperfect competition in 
markets, then profitable deviations may not be immediately arbitraged away but in rational markets, would 
eventually be arbitraged away (Cheng and Cheung, 2008; Fong, Valente and Fun, 2008).  
 
2.2 Empirical Model for Covered Interest Deviations 
 
These considerations lead one to the choice of an Asymmetric, Self-Exciting Threshold Autoregressive 
Model (ASETAR) model as the empirical model to estimate the boundaries of the no-arbitrage band 
(called the thresholds) and the speed of reversion outside the band. This model is called ‘self-exciting’ 
because the thresholds are lags of δ  itself, and asymmetric because the negative threshold is allowed to 
differ from the positive threshold. It takes the form: 
 
ttit εδρδ += −1  for ptn κδκ << −1        (3) 
( ) tntnnt εκδρκδ +−=− −1     for nt κδ ≤−1       (4) 
( ) tptppt εκδρκδ +−=− −1     for pt κδ ≥−1       (5) 
 
where ( )2,0~ σε Nt and nκ  and pκ  are the negative and positive thresholds respectively. In theory, 
the deviations inside the band are unit-root processes, so the model is estimated with 1=iρ . Note that 
this model implies that speculative activity will push the deviations to the edges of the band, rather than its 
center. The hypothesis of efficient arbitrage states that the AR(1) process outside the bands be stationary. 
If the thresholds were known, the model could be estimated by ordinary least squares applied separately 
to the inner regime and outer regime observations. Since the thresholds are not known, they may be 
estimated either by a grid search, or by a sequential method suggested in Hansen (1999) that also yields 
confidence intervals for the thresholds. In this method, a grid search is first made for a single threshold, 
yielding a minimum residual sum of squares, say ( )11 ~κS , where the function S  everywhere denotes the 
residual sum of squares function. In a two regime model, the first search would yield the stronger of the 
two threshold effects. Fixing the first-stage estimate 1
~κ , the second-stage criterion is: 
 
( ) ( )( )⎩⎨
⎧
>
<=
0~ˆ,
0~,~
112
121
22 κκκ
κκκκ
 if           
 if           
S
S
S             (6) 
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and the second-stage threshold estimate is the one that minimizes the above function, i.e.: 
 
( )222ˆ κκ Sargmin =              (7) 
 
The estimate of the first threshold is then refined as follows: 
 
( ) ( )( )⎩⎨
⎧
>
<=
0ˆˆ,
0ˆ,ˆ
221
212
11 κκκ
κκκκ
 if           
 if           
S
S
S r             (8) 
 
and the refinement estimator for the first threshold is: 
 
( )111ˆ κκ rSargmin =              (9) 
 
As a practical matter, the search is conducted over all unique values of the actual observations between 
the th5  and the th95  percentiles and is restricted so that at least 5% of observations fall in each of the 
three regimes. When the model is estimated for every year using daily observations, this restricts the 
minimum number of observations in each regime to be between 10 and 12.  
 
This process of optimization also yields confidence intervals for the thresholds. Define 
 
( ) ( ) ( )2 222222 ˆσ
κκκ SSLr −=  
 
and  
 
( ) ( ) ( )2 111111 ˆσ
κκκ
rr
r SSL −=  
 
The asymptotic ( )%1 α−  confidence intervals for 1κ  and 2κ  are the set of values of each such that 
( ) ( )ακ cLr ≤11  and ( ) ( )ακ cLr ≤22 . Hansen (1999) also shows that  
 
( ) ( )αα −−−= 11log2c  
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2.3 Integration Index 
 
To construct the Integration Index, Pasricha (2008a) takes into account five different measures that derive 
from the model. The first is the bandwidth, which measures the size of the no-arbitrage band, and is 
expected to be wider the greater the transactions costs or the effective controls in an economy. I also use 
the percentage of observations lying in the outer regimes7 (OutObs), the median positive and negative 
deviation outside the measured band (MedDevNeg and MedDevPos respectively) and the third quartile of 
continuous runs outside the band (3rdQuartile). These measures capture how frequent are profitable 
deviations from interest parity, and how fast they revert back to the band. The more elastic the supply of 
capital and the less effective the controls, the faster the reversion speed.8 One could also use the AR 
coefficients in outer regimes or the half lives, but the results should be similar. Medians and quartiles are 
preferable to average deviations as they are immune to outliers. 
 
Each of the indicators mentioned above are first normalized by subtracting from them their inter-country 
mean and dividing by the standard deviation. This makes the resulting index centered at zero. The 
normalizations are done separately for the two maturities, one and three months. For countries for which 
data on one of the maturities is not available, the available maturity's data is used to approximate for the 
missing maturity model. The Integration Index for country j  time t , jtI  is: 
 
k
I
I k
jkt
jt
∑
=  
 
where 
 
5
~3~~~~ jktjktjktjktjkt
jkt
QrtdrevPDMedevNDMedObstOuwidthdBan
I
++++−=  (10) 
k
kjkt
jkt
XX
X σ
−=~        (11) 
 
etc., and kX  and kσ  are, respectively the mean and standard deviation (over all country-time 
observations of maturity k) of X for X = Bandwidth,  OutObs,  MedDevN, MedDevP, 3rdQrt.  The equation 
(11) normalizes each of the variables (Bandwidth, OutObs etc.) so that the resulting normalized variables 
are pure numbers and can be averaged.  
 
                                                 
7  Using percentage of observations rather than number of observations takes care of the concern about uneven sample sizes 
influencing the latter. 
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Since there are no theoretical priors that allow one to assign different weights on the different components 
of the index based on their contribution to ‘openness', this index uses a simple average. Besides being 
transparent, such an average is based on the premise that greater openness means both, smaller 
deviations from parity and deviations that are arbitraged away more quickly. The negative sign in (10) 
allows larger values of the index to be interpreted as greater integration.  
 
2.4 Data and Results 
 
To construct the index, interest rates on interbank loans of 1 and 3 month maturities were used except for 
Brazil, where these were unavailable, so the Certificate of Deposit rates were used. The data on interbank 
rates are from Bloomberg and Thomson Financial's Datastream databases for all countries except South 
Africa and Columbia, whose rates were sourced from Global Financial Database, as these were 
unavailable in Bloomberg or Datastream. The exchange rate data is all from Bloomberg and Datastream. 
The forward exchange rates are onshore forward rates of 1 and 3 month maturities, except for Chile 
where onshore forward data was unavailable so non-deliverable forwards were used. For countries that 
had adopted the euro, the exchange rates pertain to the euro after Jan 1, 1999 or their date of accession, 
whichever is later. Table 1 summarizes the index for the whole sample and for high income and low and 
middle income country groupings respectively (World Bank Classification). High income countries have on 
average greater openness than low and middle income countries (mean 0.6 compared to average 
openness of -0.18 for the low and middle income group). The high income countries also see lower 
variability in their openness. Figure 1 plots the index over time for these country groups. The figure 
highlights the fact that the level of price convergence is not a slow moving variable. It fluctuates from year 
to year, even for high income countries, much more than say the degree of legal restrictions. However, it 
is important to keep in mind that the figure is not on a balanced panel. New countries are added to each 
of the income groups as their data becomes available and this may contribute to some of the fluctuations, 
especially since the total number of countries in the sample is not too large. The large dip in openness 
around the year 1998 in the low and middle income countries is due to the Asian crisis which saw the 
imposition of capital controls in these countries, most effectively in Malaysia. The dip in 2001 is due to 
Turkey's financial crisis. Figure 2 shows the low and middle income countries' average openness 
excluding Malaysia, Thailand and Turkey. Noteworthy is the large dip in openness in the current crisis. 
While the high income countries show a positive trend in openness, the same is not true for low and 
middle income countries.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
8  Note that the paper uses daily data, and thus measured deviations are those that were present at the end of the day. 
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3. Determinants of Price Convergence 
 
This section identifies determinants of de facto openness as measured by price convergence. The 
emphasis is on the relationship between price convergence and de jure capital controls and 
competitiveness of domestic banking sector. I use the following model: 
 
ititit tXIndex εγβα +++=                 (12) 
 
where itIndex  is the integration index constructed above for country i , time t , itX  are a set of country 
characteristics, detailed below and t  is a time trend. The regressions are estimated using a Prais 
Winston procedure allowing for panel specific AR(1) correction, as the residuals from the OLS fixed 
effects regressions showed autocorrelation.  
 
Explanatory variables include measures of banking competitiveness, measures of legal restrictions to 
cross-border capital flows, macroeconomic variables and measures of transactions costs and liquidity in 
the interbank and foreign exchange markets.  
 
I use four different proxies for domestic banking sector competitiveness - the net interest margins which 
equal the accounting value of banks' net interest revenue as a share of their total assets, the bank 
overhead costs to total assets ratio, return on equity for the banking sector and the bank concentration 
ratio which is the ratio of total assets of the banking sector that are owned by the three largest banks. 
Each of these variables is from the World Bank's financial structure database.9 A higher level of each of 
the variables denotes greater monopoly power in domestic banking and therefore should be associated 
with lower international integration.  Neither of these is a perfect measure of competitiveness, however 
each of these has been used as a proxy for the bank competitiveness in the literature and some are 
better than the others. Banks with market power can charge higher rates on loans and pay lower rates on 
deposits (Berger and Hannan, 1989; Hannan, 1991). Demirguc, Laeven and Levine (2003) find that 
regulatory restrictions on banking activity, including freedom of entry and lack of institutional development 
substantively increase net interest margins. They also find that the net interest margins increase with 
state control of the banking sector, and decline with development of the stock markets, which would 
compete with banks as a source of funding. Higher profits of a less competitive industry may be reflected 
in higher return on equity (ROE) or higher overhead costs (Berger and Hannan, 1998; Jayaratne and 
Strahan, 1998; Martinez Peria and Mody, 2004). The bank concentration ratio in theory should be higher 
for less competitive systems but in practice, the evidence is weak. It does not take into account the fact 
that banks may compete with non-bank financial institutions and with other financial markets or that threat 
                                                 
9  For more details on the variables and sources, see appendix table. 
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of entry matters for effective competition (Panzar and Rosse, 1987; Claessens and Laeven, 2004; Beck et 
al., 2006).   
 
In order to account for the competition banks may face from non-bank financial sectors, I use a measure 
of financial development which is the first principal component of the life insurance premiums ratio to GDP, 
stock market capitalization ratio to GDP, stock market total value as ratio to GDP and domestic credit to 
private sector as percentage of GDP. The first three are from the World Bank's financial structure 
database and the last from the World Bank's World Development Indicators database.  
 
While the level of capital controls determine the de facto financial integration, market players often find 
ways to evade the controls, so the relation need not be one-to-one. Moreover, even in the absence of 
capital controls, other imperfections - transactions and information costs, asymmetric information, 
imperfect competition etc. - impinge on the price convergence with international markets, so that even in 
the absence of capital controls, price convergence may not be perfect. The coefficient on the de jure 
measure of openness is therefore expected to be positive but less than one. I use the Chinn-Ito measure 
of capital account openness (KA Open), which takes higher values for fewer legal restrictions on capital 
flows across borders.  
 
Bank competitiveness, capital controls as well as the risk of future controls may be positively related to 
the degree of development of institutions in the country (Claessens and Laeven, 2004; Ito and Chinn, 
2007). On the other hand, for any given level of capital controls, evasion would be more the worse the 
institutions. I include a measure of institutional development, which is the first principal component of 
corruption and political risk indices from PR Group's International Country Risk Guide. Higher levels of 
these variables reflect lower corruption or risk. The sign of the institutional variable may be positive or 
negative.  
 
As a proxy for transactions costs in currency markets, I compute the percentage bid-ask spread (as a 
percentage of mean rate) in the spot exchange rate markets using daily data. An average of these for the 
year for each currency is included as an explanatory variable (X_Spread). One would expect higher 
average spreads to be associated with lower openness. Similar spreads on interbank interest rates were 
not available for most of the countries in the sample.  
 
I compute the coefficient of variations in the interbank and average for the 1- and 3- month forward 
exchange rate markets, as volatility in the markets may be used to proxy for the lack of liquidity in the 
markets, as well as for the risk premia. 
 
Crisis periods often see either new capital controls imposed or renewed enforcement of existing 
regulations. Banking crisis periods, additionally are also periods of heightened counterparty risks and 
lower liquidity in interbank markets, and serve here to control for these risk premia. Both kinds of crisis 
  10
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periods are therefore expected to be associated with lower price convergence. I include two dummy 
variables for crisis periods in the regressions, one for a banking crisis and another for a currency crisis. 
The Currency Crisis dummy uses the Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) index of currency market turbulence 
(a weighted average of exchange rate and reserve changes) to identify crisis months and takes the value 
1 for years in which there was one or more crisis month. The Bank Crisis dummy variable takes the value 
1 for years in which there was a systemic banking crisis and is taken from Laeven and Valencia (2008).  
 
Finally, a trend variable is included to test if the world has indeed become more globalized over time, 
GDP per capita in thousands of 2000 US dollars to test if higher income countries are more integrated 
after controlling for their level of financial development, institutions etc, and the ratio of trade to GDP. 
Greater trade integration should make it easier to evade capital controls as over-invoicing of imports and 
under-invoicing of exports are popular ways of exporting capital in countries with controls (Aizenman 2008; 
Aizenman and Noy, 2009; Prasad and Rajan, 2008; Claessens and Naude, 1993).  
 
The analysis is done first for the entire sample of countries and then for the two groups - high income and 
low and middle income countries - separately. The list of countries included in each group are presented 
in Table 3. Table 4 presents the summary statistics of each of the regressors for all countries and by 
income group. Several of the variables have different mean values by income group. Table 5 presents the 
results of difference in means tests for some variables of interest, by income group. For each variable of 
interest, Table 5 presents the results of an OLS regression on the high income dummy variable and a 
constant. The estimated constants are then the mean values of the dependent variable for the low and 
middle income group. High income countries have net interest margins and overhead costs that are 
significantly lower than low and middle income countries. The return on equity is not significantly different 
between the two groups, and concentration in banking assets is actually significantly larger for high 
income countries than for low and middle income countries. This, combined with the significantly higher 
level of financial development (non-bank financial sector) in the high income economies, suggests that 
concentration may not be the best proxy for the level of competitiveness of the banking sector. This is 
consistent with the results of Claessens and Laeven (2004) who create a measure of bank 
competitiveness based on contestability of the market and find that it does not negatively relate to 
concentration. Moreover, the correlation between net interest margins and de jure controls is -0.45, 
indicating that countries with greater openness are also the ones with lower net interest margins and 
underscoring the validity of net interest margins as a proxy for lack of competitiveness in banking rather 
than for bank efficiency.  
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3.1 Results on Bank Competition and International Financial Integration 
 
3.1.1 Full Sample 
 
The results of the regressions are presented in Tables 6 to 8. Table 6 presents the results for the entire 
sample. The coefficient on net interest margins is negative and significant at 1 percent level, implying that 
less competitive banking systems are associated with lower price convergence with the rest of the world. 
The X-standardized coefficient on net interest margin is -0.09.10 This value means that a one standard 
deviation increase in the net interest margin would lead to a fall in the integration index of 0.09, or a 0.20 
standard deviation fall.  As an example, if Argentina's net interest margins fell from 0.061 in 2005 to the 
level of net interest margins in Belgium in 2005, or 0.0149 (a 2.57 standard deviation fall) other things 
being equal, its integration index would rise from -0.258 to -0.026, roughly the level for Singapore in 2004.  
 
When overhead costs as a proportion of bank assets is used as a proxy for competitiveness, the result is 
again a negative coefficient that is significant at the 10 percent level. The coefficient on return on equity is 
not significant but negative, while that on the concentration index is positive. Since previous studies have 
shown that concentration is only weakly, if at all, related to banking sector competitiveness, I looked for 
threshold effects in the financial development variable. The idea is that markets like Hong Kong, 
Singapore and the UK, which have concentration ratios exceeding 0.95 for one or more years (it is 0.99 
for Singapore in 2005) may nevertheless have competitive banking systems that face competition from 
the non-bank financial sector. I therefore created a variable that is the product of concentration and 
negative of the financial development index, for values of financial development below the threshold, and 
zero otherwise. This variable would take larger (positive) values for markets that have greater 
concentration and lower financial development, as long as financial development is below the threshold, 
and is zero otherwise. For values of financial development between -0.9 (roughly the th34  percentile) and 
-1.50 (the th17  percentile) the coefficient of the interaction term was negative and significant.11 The 
interaction term in Table 6, column (4) uses the threshold -0.9. This suggests that at low levels of financial 
development, the coefficient of the concentration variable is smaller, although it is still positive.  
 
The coefficient for de jure openness is positive and significant and roughly the same size in all columns of 
Table 6. The X-standardized coefficient for de jure openness is lower than the one for net interest margins 
(0.07), but larger than that for overheads. These results indicate that although capital controls do lead to 
lower price convergence, the relationship is far from one to one. This is consistent with the widely held 
                                                 
10  The X-standardized coefficient is the beta multiplied by the standard deviation of the X-variable. 
11  For thresholds lower than the 17 th  percentile, the coefficient was still negative but not significant, which may be because the 
number of observations actually used in regressions for which the threshold was not crossed was too low. 
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view that market players find ways around controls and with other studies on the effectiveness of capital 
controls.12  
 
Both exchange rate spreads and coefficient of variation in exchange rates enter with a negative sign, as 
expected and are significant in all regressions in the full country sample, indicating that liquidity and 
shocks play an important role in determining price-convergence. There is a significant positive trend in 
openness, indicating that the recent wave of globalization has led to price convergence. Currency crises 
are associated with a significant decline in openness, other things being the same, but in the full sample, 
the same is not true for banking crises.  
 
3.1.2 Results by Income Group 
 
Table 7 presents the results using data on high income countries only. In this country grouping, the only 
variables that enter significantly are the level of legal restrictions, a trend and the level of institutional 
development. All have a positive sign, indicating that the fewer the restrictions on flows and the better the 
institutions, the higher the level of openness. Given the high level of de jure openness in these countries, 
it is not surprising that most of the banking competitiveness variables are not significant. As discussed in 
the introduction, when there are no or few constraints on access to overseas financial markets, the level 
of banking competition becomes irrelevant. The positive and significant coefficient on return on equity 
may only reflect greater efficiency in these markets. The 2R  in the high-income country regressions are 
also quite low.  
 
In contrast, the 2R  for the low and middle income country samples are very high, around 0.7 for each 
specification. The banking sector competitiveness indicators, net interest margins, overheads and return 
on equity, all have negative coefficients that are larger in magnitude than for the full sample, and 
significant at the 1 percent level. The concentration index is not significant. Currency crisis and greater 
volatility in the forex markets are both associated with significantly low levels of de facto openness, 
whereas both institutional quality and financial development are associated with higher de facto openness. 
De jure restrictions matter, but the coefficients are smaller than for the high income country sample and 
not always significant. Trade and GDP enter with negative signs and are both significant but that may just 
reflect the fact that there were several crisis episodes in the emerging markets with higher GDPs and 
trade-openness in the sample under consideration and that we have a smaller time series for these 
countries than for higher income countries.  
 
 
 
                                                 
12  See, for example, Garber (1998), Garcia (2006) and Aizenman (2004) for studies on evasion of capital controls and Cheung, 
Yiu and Chow (2009) for a similar study in the context of trade agreements. 
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4. Concluding Remarks 
 
This paper develops a price based measure of financial openness using methods first proposed in 
Pasricha (2008) for 54 countries and for an average of 13 years per country. This index captures an 
important aspect of international financial integration - the degree to which interest rates are aligned with 
international markets - that has so far been missing in the studies of impact of financial openness on 
growth, macroeconomic volatility as well as contagion. While there is a clear trend of increasing openness 
in the high income countries before the onset of the current crisis, the same was not true for the 
developing countries. 
 
Further, this paper makes a contribution to the literature on determinants of de facto integration and looks 
at a previously ignored angle - the relationship between banking sector competitiveness and de facto 
integration. Although none of the measures used are perfect, they all point to a strong link between bank 
competitiveness and price convergence in international markets, especially for low and middle income 
countries. This has several policy implications. The restrictions on international integration are not the 
sum total of controls on cross border transactions - domestic regulations impinge on international 
integration. Liberalizing domestic financial sectors may provide all the benefits of more efficient domestic 
allocation of resources but in addition would provide the benefits from a greater international integration. 
Schaeck et al. (2006) find that more competitive banking systems are more stable and Fecht et al. (2007) 
find that greater international integration of interbank markets enchances resiliance to ideosyncratic 
shocks. The link between the two may be that more competitive systems are also more integrated with 
the rest of the world.     
 
The paper also finds that the determinants of price integration differ between developed and developing 
countries. Periods of volatility and currency crisis are periods of low price-integration for developing 
countries. Moreover, for this group, while the link between capital controls and price-convergence exists, 
it is not strong, providing further proof that capital controls do get evaded. In both the developed and 
developing country samples, greater financial development is associated with greater de facto openness. 
Trade openness is not a significant determinant of de facto integration in developed markets but is 
associated with lower integration in the developing countries sample. This may be because the study 
ignores threshold effects. Increasing trade openness may increase convergence but only when the level 
of de jure controls are high and when corruption is high. The impact of tightening of capital controls on de 
facto integration may also depend on the level of institutional development. These thresholds effects may 
be a subject of future research. 
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Table 1. Integration Index Availability 
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Table 1. (Cont’d) Integration Index Availability  
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Table 2. International Integration Index: Summary Statistics 
 
 
 
Table 3. Countries by Income Group 
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Table 4. Summary Statistics 
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Table 4. (Cont’d) Summary Statistics 
 
 
Note: -GDP per capita is in thousands of 2000 US dollars. 
 
Table 5. Difference in Means Tests 
 
 
Note: - Net Int Margin refers to Net Interest Margins, FinclDEvpt is the Financial Development Index, Instn refers to Institutional 
index. The table shows the output of OLS regression of the variable in the column header on the dummy variable 
High_Income and a constant. The estimated constant term is the mean of the dependent variable for Low and Middle 
income countries. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
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Table 6. Explaining De Facto Integration 
 
 
 
 
Note: - Regressions use Prais-Winston 2SLS proceedure with panel specific AR(1) error processes. Standard errors in 
parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
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Table 7. Explaining De Facto Integration: High Income Countries 
 
 
Note: - Regressions use Prais-Winston 2SLS proceedure with panel specific AR(1) error processes. Standard errors in 
parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
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Table 8. Explaining De Facto Integration: Low and Middle Income Countries 
 
 
Note: - Regressions use Prais-Winston 2SLS proceedure with panel specific AR(1) error processes. Standard errors in 
parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
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Figure 1. Integration Index, by Income Group 
 
 
Figure 2. Integration Index, by Income Group (Excluding Malaysia, Thailand and Turkey) 
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Appendix. Data Sources 
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Appendix. (Cont’d) Data Sources 
 
 
 
